Covert Arms Programs Exposed

The British intelligence organization, MI5, has compiled a listing of more than 360 private companies, university departments, and government organizations in eight countries that have purchased goods and technology for use in weapons programs.

The listing is displayed on a secret document entitled Companies and Organisations of Proliferation Concern which indicates a much more extensive arms trade market than previously made public. As a result, MI5 is warning against exporting arms-related products to organizations in South Asia and the Middle East and, in particular, front companies in the United Arab Emirates, an apparent hub for the trade.

From the Guardian Unlimited:

The 17-page document identifies 95 Pakistani organisations and government bodies, including the Pakistan high commission in London, as having assisted in the country's nuclear programme.

[ ... ]

Some 114 Iranian organisations, including chemical and pharmaceutical companies and university medical schools, are identified as having acquired nuclear, chemical, biological or missile technology. The document also attempts to shed some light on the nuclear ambitions of Egypt and Syria: a private chemical company in Egypt is identified as having procured technology for use in a nuclear weapons programme, while the Syrian atomic energy commission faces a similar charge. Eleven Israeli organisations appear on the list, along with 73 Indian bodies, which are said to have been involved in WMD programmes.

The document also highlights concerns that companies in Malta and Cyprus could have been used as fronts for WMD programmes. The United Arab Emirates is named as "the most important" of the countries where front companies may have been used, and 24 private firms there are identified as having acquired WMD technology for Iran, Pakistan and India.

Representatives of the various governments are formulating their responses to the report. A Pakistani official, Abdul Basit, the Deputy High Commissioner, believes it to be "absolute rubbish" to include his country and the UAE claim to have worked "very closely" with British authorities.

There may be errors, but I suspect that the document has considerable merit. Potential links to rogue organizations need to be known by exporting agencies.

Companion post at In The Bullpen.